



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS  
BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE, DC 20332

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF:

IVG

21 JUL 1980

SUBJECT:

CRIME SPECIAL STUDY 80-14

The USAF Transportation System and the Heroin Smuggling Threat: A  
Macro-Vulnerability Study (SEVEN CRESCENTS)

LD:

All AFOSI Dists, Dets and RAs (CAT III)

1. Purpose. The purpose of this study is to restate the Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin threat to the USAF transportation system and to describe vulnerabilities in the system as they are perceived from a macro-level. The perspective presented here is a collation of information obtained in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Customs and other military investigative agencies.

2. INTRODUCTION: Seven Bulldogs. In March 1974, A KC-135, returning from U-Tapao AB, Thailand, landed at Barksdale AFB, LA, carrying over \$222,000 worth of heroin concealed in a 20-man liferaft. The 63.9 grams of heroin was 94-98% pure. The AFOSI investigation following this accidental find eventually focused in on a crew member who was allegedly a heroin user. As an outgrowth of this investigation, Operation Seven Bulldogs was initiated by HQ AFOSI to determine whether or not a ring-type narcotics smuggling activity using USAF aircraft existed. The resultant, extensive investigative effort and detailed analysis failed to identify any organized, military heroin trafficking ring operating between Southeast Asia (SEA) and CONUS. It did, however, identify small groups of USAF personnel independently trafficking heroin. The operation eventually resulted in the apprehension of eight major drug dealers and the seizure of more than \$700,000 worth of heroin.

3. Southwest Asian Heroin and the USAF Heroin Problem. Narcotics intelligence estimates (outlined in Crime Information Reports 80-1 and 80-3) spell out the threat posed by extremely large opium harvests in SWA. These reports suggest that the resultant availability of heroin to U.S. Forces stationed in Europe and Southwest Asia approaches and perhaps even surpasses the availability of Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin to our forces stationed in SEA during the peak years of the Vietnam conflict. Based on statistics from all sources, the USAF does not have a serious problem in terms of number of the individuals involved. For the first quarter of CY 1980, the USAF drug abuse control program reflected a .2 per 1,000 USAF members rate for members identified as using opiates through all reporting vehicles. This figure is down significantly from the 1.0 rate per 1,000 for CYs 1974 and 1975. This fact notwithstanding, there has been a rise in the last two quarters in the total number of opiate abusers identified through the drug abuse control program in USAFE. In the third quarter of CY 1979, five USAF associated personnel were so identified in USAFE. During the fourth quarter, CY 1979, ten persons were identified and by the end of the first quarter, CY 1980, thirteen more had been identified.

USAF review(s) completed.

4. BACKGROUND: Two factors drive the SWA heroin threat. The first factor is the existence of a lucrative market in both Europe and the United States for this heroin. The second is the belief that huge profits can be made through exploiting vulnerabilities in the customs system to move this glut of heroin into these areas.

a. The Market. The USAF transportation system is threatened by the existence of a lucrative heroin market in Europe and in the CONUS. The European market for heroin has been saturated with SWA heroin to the extent that high purity heroin appears to be readily available for a relatively low price. Conversely, the CONUS market, according to DEA sources, still suffers from a drought of heroin. Heroin on the CONUS market is of low purity but sells for a relatively high price. These circumstances exist in spite of the fact that DEA estimates that 70 percent of the heroin available on the streets of major U.S. cities is SWA heroin. The availability of heroin in Europe could open the door to a lucrative U.S. Forces market there. This, and the demand for heroin in the CONUS, could stimulate efforts to exploit the USAF transportation system within Europe and from Europe to the CONUS.

b. Heroin Interests. The three classes of persons likely to attempt to exploit the transportation system are (1) heroin abusers, (2) heroin dealers, and (3) heroin traffickers ("dealers" refers to individuals operating alone and selling to users for profit and "traffickers" refers to persons seeking to supply other traffickers/dealers). Each of these three classes is assumed to exist to some degree in the USAF population. However, the threat to the USAF transportation system posed by these three interests is further complicated by the variety of populations serviced by the system. For example, the USAF system transports service members from all branches of the military and DoD civilians. The system also moves all APO U.S. Forces mail. Further, this "in-house" threat is multiplied by the fact that the system could be targeted and exploited by civilian organized criminal elements.


5. Current Intelligence Threat Estimate. The primary threat to the USAF transportation system lies in independent smuggling activities by individuals or small groups directly associated with the USAF (as in "Seven Bulldogs," supra). However, to date, no incidents of smuggling heroin through the USAF transportation system have been identified in Europe or in the CONUS. European and domestic efforts to interdict heroin smuggled through traditional, civilian methods have not yet forced traffickers to pursue alternate transportation systems. If organized criminal elements decide to attempt to smuggle large quantities of SWA heroin to the CONUS and begin to compete with what are now essentially Turkish and Iranian traffickers, USAF personnel and the transportation system may be targeted as an alternative method of moving heroin.

6. Areas of Vulnerability. The USAF transportation system is vulnerable to smuggling activities in four areas: (1) concealment on USAF aircraft/vehicles, (2) concealment on the person or in the baggage of individuals traveling via USAF aircraft/vehicles, (3) concealment in household goods shipments/cargo and (4) concealment in mail. Each of these

areas is susceptible to a wide variety of smuggling techniques. These techniques, especially when they involve high-value items which can be placed in small packages, such as heroin, are limited only by the brashness and ingenuity of the individuals involved. Appendix C takes a closer look at these four areas and at some of the smuggling techniques known to have been used in the past. Each of these areas has built-in "weaknesses" which can be taken advantage of by individuals or conspirators to move SWA heroin from one point to a number of other points. Most of these weaknesses are of such a nature that further regulatory action to overcome them would severely restrict the ability of the USAF transportation system to effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. Because of this, AFOSI source coverage and dedicated concern on the part of USAF commanders, customs inspectors and cargo/passenger processors and other command officials will be necessary if an effective deterrent to smuggling activities is to be created.

7. Summary. There is no intelligence or investigative information which suggests that the USAF transportation system is currently being used to smuggle SWA heroin. AFOSI investigative activity within recent months has confirmed that a few USAF members in USAFE are/have been actively involved in trafficking heroin to other military members in the vicinity of their installations. Narcotics intelligence does not forecast a significant drop in the massive quantities of SWA heroin available for illicit markets in Europe and the United States. This availability, the disparity of prices for this heroin between the U.S. and European markets, and continuing financial problems, resulting from the low salaries of military members, all could make the monetary attractiveness of involvement in the smuggling of SWA heroin a serious temptation for USAF personnel who have access to local drug communities overseas and in the CONUS. Operation Seven Bulldogs confirmed that similar conditions resulted in small groups of USAF personnel becoming involved in heroin smuggling activities in the early and mid seventies. The potential for a resurgence of this activity as a result of current conditions poses a serious threat to the USAF transportation system.

8. The information contained in this report is intended for internal USAF use only. Pertinent portions of the macro-vulnerability study should be discussed with theater and base level commanders and appropriate USAF officials at these and MAJCOM levels who are directly responsible for managing the USAF transportation system. Dissemination of the information outside of USAF channels should not be made without prior coordination with the Director of Criminal Investigations, HQ AFOSI.

  
JOE L. HARVELL, Jr., Colonel, USAF  
Director of Criminal Investigations

#### Appendices

- A. USAF Scheduled Air Routes within USAFE and between CONUS and USAFE, Jul 80.
- B. Known/suspected SWA Heroin Trafficking Patterns
- C. Areas Most Susceptible to SWA Heroin Smuggling and a Capsulization of Known Smuggling Techniques

## Appendix A

USAF Scheduled Air Routes within USAFE and between CONUS and USAFE, Jul 80

1. Stable Air Routes are Conducive to Smuggling. The U.S Air Force is tasked with a variety of missions in Europe and SWA in support of U.S. interests in those areas. These taskings include transportation support for all major USAF locations in USAFE. In many cases this means the Air Force operates the only air service available to and between most of these locations. The fact that much of the air traffic involved in these missions fly "established" routes may make them particularly attractive to potential smugglers. (See Appendix C for more detailed information concerning this subject.) To unscrupulous air crew members, these routes mean predictability in the customs inspections given to their personal baggage, their person and the aircraft in general. To aerial port and aircraft maintenance personnel with an active interest in the drug trade, they mean relatively dependable routes and arrival times which could facilitate conspiracy between them and their co-conspirators at other locations. These factors also mean specific hiding places and retrieval schedules can be established well in advance of the targeted mission and predesignated signalling devices can be used to alert their partners as to whether the aircraft or cargo contains concealed drugs. As with the air crew members, the fact that the specific missions generally fly set patterns/routes greatly assists the DoD passenger (PAX), who is attempting to smuggle drugs, in determining in advance what he can expect in the way of inspections of his baggage and his person. In sum, each of these three classes of people, aircrew, ground crew and PAX can be aided in a drug smuggling effort by the relative stability offered in the USAF air transport mission within USAFE and between USAFE and other areas of the world serviced by the USAF transportation system.

2. Caveat. The scope of this appendix is necessarily limited. References to the USAF transportation system are made with the understanding that the USAF is not the only military carrier that may be flying a given route. Indeed, many of these same routes are flown on a scheduled or non-scheduled basis by other military air traffic, both foreign and U.S. (e.g., US Army and Navy aircraft as well as the USAF's own SAC and TAC aircraft). In addition, the "scheduled" routes described herein are subject to change at anytime and should not be read or relied upon as a fixed schedule. MAC also flies certain missions in support of U.S. embassies in USAFE and SWA to include countries where the SWA heroin threat is greatest such as Pakistan. These flights are not regularly scheduled, are very rare, and are generated almost exclusively on an as needed basis for personnel support in those embassies.

3. Current Scheduled Air Routes (Jul 80). While the vast majority of USAF air traffic in USAFE could not be categorized as "scheduled," still many routes and schedules remain relatively constant. Attached are lists of current, scheduled routes flown by MAC aircraft. The list is broken down by aircraft type (e.g., C-130, C-141, C-5, and C-9A) and the routes flown by each type of aircraft each day of the week. Also appended are maps depicting the routes these aircraft fly. Some of these will be deleted or at least changed from time to time, but many are established routes which will probably continue into the foreseeable future.

4 Attachments


1. C-141 Routes Broken Down by Day of the Week
2. C-5 Routes Broken Down by Day of the Week.
3. C-130 Routes Broken Down by Day of the Week.
4. C-9A and C-130 Medevac Routes.

C - 141 SUNDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA429F ABA430	Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick, Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
B	ABA442	Jedda, Saudi Arabia - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
C	ABA442	Jedda, Saudi Arabia - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
D	ABA4F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
E	ABA4J1F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Amman, Jordan
F	ABA4T2	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
G	AQAY417AF	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
H	ABA4J1F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
I	ANA707F	Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain.
J	AQA707F ANA708	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
K	PBA8R3F ANA 708	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE
L	AQA708A	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB, Azores
M	PBA8R3F PBA8R4	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE

Attachment 1

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


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<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA429F ABA430	Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick, Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
B	ABA443	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Jedda, Saudi Arabia
C	ABA4F4	Rhein-Main, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
D	ABA4W6	Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
E	ABA747	Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS, Spain - Bahrain, Bahrain
F	ABA759 ABA760	Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS, Spain - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Naples, Italy - Rota NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
G	AJA7V3	Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB, Spain
H	AQAY417AF	Rhein-Main, FRG - Athens, Greece- Cigli CDI, Turkey - Ankara, Turkey - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main, FRG
I	AQA4J1F	Ramstein AB, FRG - Amman, Jordan
J	ANA707A	Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
K	AQA707F ANA708	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
L	ANA708	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE
M	PBA8R5F PBA8R6	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE

# EUROPE - MIDDLE EAST

C-141 MONDAY



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<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA429F ABA430	Charleston AFB, SC - Prestwick, Scotland - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
B	AJA435	Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece
C	ABA4F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
D	ABA4J2	Amman, Jordan - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
E	ABA7V1 ABA7V4	Torrejon AB, Spain - Pisa, Italy - Aviano AB, Italy - Torrejon AB, Spain
F	ABA7V3 ABA7V4	Torrejon AB, Spain - Aviano AB, Italy - Pisa, Italy - Torrejon AB, Spain
G	AQAY418AF	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
H	AQAY417F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
I	ANA708A	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
J	ANA707F	Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
K	ANA708	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE
L	ALA7F7F AKA7F7F	Lajes AB, Azores - Rhein-Main AB, FRG (Medevac Aircraft)
M	AQA7R1	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG

C-141 TUESDAY




C - 141 WEDNESDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
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B	ABA431 ABA432	Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
C	ABA436	Athens, Greece - Torrejon AB, Spain
D	ABA444	Jedda, Saudi Arabia - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
E	ABA4F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
F	ABA748	Bahrain, Bahrain - Athens, Greece - Rota NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
G	ABA751 ABA752	Rota NAS, Spain - Naples, Italy - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Rota NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
H	ABA7R3	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
I	ABA7V4	Torrejon AB, Spain - McGuire AFB, NJ
J	AQAY417F AQAY418F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Ankara, Turkey - Cigli CDI, Turkey - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
K	ANA707A	Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
L	AQA708A	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB, Azores
M	AQA707F ANA708	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK

N	ALA7F8F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Andrews AFB, MD. (Medevac Aircraft)
P	AQA7R2	Ramstein AB, FRG - McGuire AFB, NJ
R	PBA8R5F PBA8R6	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE

C-141 WEDNESDAY

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST



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C - 141 THURSDAY


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B	ABA431 ABA432	Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall RAFB, U.K. - Charleston AFB, SC
C	ABA435 ABA436	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
D	AJA441 ABA441	Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB, Spain - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Jedda, Saudi Arabia
E	ABA4F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
F	ABA7R4	Ramstein AB, FRG - McGuire AFB, NJ
G	ABAY715	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
H	AQAY418F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
I	AQAY417F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
J	ANA708A	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
K	ANA707F	Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
L	ANA708	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE
M	AKA7F7F	Lajes AB, Azores - Rhein-Main AB, FRG (Medevac Aircraft)
N	PBA8R3F PBA8R4	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE



# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-141 THURSDAY

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
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C-141 FRIDAY

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B	ABA431 ABA432	Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
C	ABA4F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
D	ABA759 ABA760	Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS, Spain - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Naples, Italy - Rota NAS, Spain - Norfolk NAS, VA
E	ABAY716	Ramstein AB, FRG - McGuire AFB, NJ
F	AQAY417F AQAY418F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Ankara, Turkey - Cigli CDI, Turkey - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
G	AQA708A	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Lajes AB, Azores
H	AQA707F ANA708	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Incirlik CDI, Turkey- Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
I	ANA707A	Lajes AB, Azores - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
J	ALA7F8F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Andrews AFB, MD (Medevac Aircraft)
K	PBA8R4 PBA8R3F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Dover AFB, DE

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-141 FRIDAY




C - 141 SATURDAY

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B	ABA431 ABA432	Charleston AFB, SC - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Charleston AFB, SC
C	ABA4F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
D	ABA4R3 ABA4R4	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
E	ABA4T1F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG- Incirlik CDI, Turkey
F	ABA4W5	Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB, Spain - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
G	ABA751 AVA752	Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS, Spain - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Naples, Italy - Norfolk NAS, VA
H	AQAY418F	Rhein-Main, FRG - Charleston AFB, SC
I	ANA707F	Dover AFB, DE - Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain
J	ANA707A ANA708A	Torrejon AB, Spain - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
K	PBA 8R5F PBA 8R6	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE

EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-141 SATURDAY




C - 5 SUNDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA248	Bahrain, Bahrain - Rota NAS, Spain
B	ABA2F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein Main AB, FRG
C	ABA2F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
D	ABA2R3F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG.
E	ABA2W4	Torrejon AB, Spain - Dover AFB, DE

Attachment 2

C-5 SUNDAY




C - 5 MONDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA248	Rota NAS, Spain - Dover AFB, DE
B	ABA2F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
C	ABA2R4	Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
D	ABA2T3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
E	PBA3F6	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE



C-5 MONDAY

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST




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
C - 5 TUESDAY

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B	ABA2F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
C	ABA2T3F	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Incirlik CDI, Turkey
D	PBA3P3 ABA2W5F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG




C - 5 WEDNESDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
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B	ABA2T4	Incirlik CDI, Tukey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
C	AQA2W5F	Ramstein AB, FRG - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia



C - 5 THURSDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA2F3AF	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
B	ABA2F4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
C	ABA2R3F	Dover AFB, DE - Ramstein AB, FRG
D	ABA2T1F	Torrejon AB, Spain - Incirlik CDI, Turkey
E	AQA2W6	Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Ramstein AB, FRG
F	PBA3R4	Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE




C - 5 FRIDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA247F	Norfolk NAS, VA - Rota NAS, Spain
B	ABA2R4	Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
C	ABA2T2	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE
D	ABA2W3F	Dover AFB, DE - Torrejon AB, Spain
E	ABA2W6	Ramstein AB, FRG - Dover AFB, DE




C-5 FRIDAY



C - 5 SATURDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	ABA247E	Rota NAS, Spain - Bahrain, Bahrain
B	ABA2F3F	Dover AFB, DE - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
C	ABA2W3F ABA2W4	Torrejon AB, Spain - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Torrejon AB, Spain
D	PBA3F5	Tinker AFB, OK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG

C-5 SATURDAY




C - 130 SUNDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA17A5, 17A6 17C5, 17C6	Athens, Greece - Akrotiri, Cyprus - Athens, Greece - Iraklion, Crete - Athens, Greece
B	UQA1739	Athens, Greece - Tel Aviv, Israel
C	UQA1740	Tel Aviv, Israel - Athens, Greece
D	UBA17T4	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Mildenhall RAFB, UK

Attachment 3

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-130 SUNDAY




C - 130 MONDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1717	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Ramstein AB, FRG - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain
B	UQA17A3	Athens, Greece - Akrotiri, Cyprus
C	UQA17A4	Akrotiri, Cyprus - Athens, Greece
D	UQA1759 UQA17D3 UQA17D4	Athens, Greece - Naples, Italy - Olbia, Sardinia, Italy - Naples, Italy - Decimomannu, Sardinia, Italy
E	UJA17E7 UQA17E7 UQA17E8 UVA17E8	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Alhorn, FRG - Sembach AB, FRG - Bentwaters RAFB, UK - Mildenhall RAFB, UK

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-130 MONDAY




C - 130 TUESDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1718	Torrejon AB, Spain - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
B	UQA1736	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Ramstein AB, FRG - Athens, Greece
C	UQA17A5,17A6 UQA17C5,17C6	Athens, Greece - Akrotiri, Cyprus
D	UQA17D1 UQA17D2	Decimomannu, Sardinia, Italy - Aviano AB, Italy - Decimomannu, Sardinia, Italy - Naples, Italy
E	UQA16B1 UQA16B2	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Berlin, FRG - Rhein-Main, FRG.




EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST



C - 130 WEDNESDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1717	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Ramstein AB, FRG - Aviano AB, Italy - Torrejon AB, Spain
B	UQA1739	Athens, Greece - Tel Aviv, Israel
C	UQA1740	Tel Aviv, Israel - Athens, Greece
D	UQA1759	Athens, Greece - Brindisi, Italy - Aviano AB, Italy - Naples, Italy
E	UQA17D3 UQA17D4	Naples, Italy - Reggio, Italy - Olbia, Sardinia, Italy - Naples, Italy
F	UJA17E7 UQA17E7 UQA17E8 UVA17E8	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Bentwaters RAFB, UK - Alhorn, FRG - Sembach AB, FRG - Bentwaters RAFB, UK - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
G	UJA1613 UJA1614	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Ramstein AB, FRG - Oslo, Norway - Ramstein AB, FRG
H	UQA1655 UQA16P3 UQA16P4	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain - Mahon, Spain - Palma, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain.
I	UQA1655 UQA1661 UQA16P7 UQA16P8	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain - Rota NAS, Spain - Alverca, Portugal - Rota NAS, Spain.


C-130 WEDNESDAY



C - 130 THURSDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1718	Torrejon AB, Spain - Aviano AB, Italy - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
B	UQA1760	Naples, Italy - Brindisi, Italy - Athens, Greece
C	UQA1751 UQA1752	Naples, Italy - Signiella, Sicily, Italy - Souda, Crete - Naples, Italy.
D	UQA17V1 UQA17D1 UQA17D2	Athens, Greece - Aviano AB, Italy - Decimomannu, Sardinia, Italy - Aviano AB, Italy.
E	UQA16H1 UQA16H2 UVA16H2	Ramstein AB, FRB - Soesterberg RNAF, Netherlands - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
F	UQA1662 UQA16G1 UQA16G2 UQA1656	Rota NAS, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
G	UQA1661 UQA1662 UQA16G3 UQA16G4 UQA1656	Torrejon AB, Spain - Rota NAS, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
H	UBA16W1	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Athens, Greece - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

C-130 THURSDAY




C - 130 FRIDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1717	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Ramstein AB, FRG - Decimomannu, Sardinia, Italy - Torrejon AB, Spain
B	UQA1736	Aviano AB, Italy - Brindisi, Italy - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
C	UQA17D3 UQA17D4 UVA17D4	Naples, Italy - Olbia, Sardinia, Italy - Naples, Italy - Mildenhall RAFB, U.K.
D	UJA17E7 UQA17E7 UQA17E8 UVA17E8	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Bentwaters RAFB, UK - Alhorn, FRG - Sembach AB, FRG - Bentwaters RAFB, UK - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
E	UQA16B1 UQA16B2	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Berlin, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
F	UBA16WZ	Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main, FRG.

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

C-130 FRIDAY




C - 130 SATURDAY

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	UQA1718	Torrejón AB, Spain - Ramstein AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, UK
B	UQA1735 UBA1735	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Aviano AB, Italy - Athens, Greece
C	UBA17T1 UBA17T3	Mildenhall RAFB, UK - Ramstein AB, FRG - Incirlik CDI, Turkey
D	UBA17T2	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Mildenhall RAFB, UK



EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST




## C-9A MEDEVAC FLIGHTS (SATURDAY-TUESDAY)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DAYS</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	2LA10T3	Sat,Sun	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Athens, Greece - Cigli CDI, Turkey - Incirlik CDI, Turkey
B	2LA10W1	Sun	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia - Bahrain, Bahrain - Cairo, Egypt - Incirlik CDI, Turkey
C	2LA1041	Mon	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Pisa, Italy - Aviano AB, Italy - Furstfeldbruck, FRG - Nurnberg, FRG - Stuttgart, FRG - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
D	2LA10T4	Mon	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Iraklion, Crete - Athens, Greece - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
E	21LA1051	Tues	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Brindisi, Italy - Naples, Italy - Venice, Italy - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
F	2LA1065	Tues	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Rota NAS, Spain - Torrejon AB, Spain - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG

Attachment 4

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST SAT - TUES

C-9A MEDEVAC FLIGHTS




## C-9A MEDEVAC FLIGHTS (WEDNESDAY-FRIDAY)

<u>INDEX</u>	<u>MISSION</u>	<u>DAYS</u>	<u>ROUTE</u>
A	2LA10T7	WED	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Aviano AB, Italy - Athens, Greece - Iraklion, Crete - Incirlik CDI, Turkey.
B	2LA1031	THURS	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Mildenhall RAFB, U.K. - Berlin, FRG - Ramstein AB, FRG - Rhein-Main AB, FRG
C	2LA10T8	THURS	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Cigli CDI, Turkey - Athens, Greece - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
D	2LA1051	FRI	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Ramstein AB, FRG - Venice, Italy - Naples, Italy - Brindisi, Italy - Sigonella, Sicily, Italy - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
E	2LA1065	FRI	Rhein-Main AB, FRG - Ramstein AB, FRG - Torrejon AB, Spain - Rota NAS, Spain - Zaragoza AB, Spain - Rhein-Main AB, FRG.
F	UNK	MON, THURS	Incirlik CDI, Turkey - Ankara, Turkey - Incirlik CDI, Turkey (Note: These flights utilize C-130 aircraft.)

# EUROPE - AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST WED - FRI

C-9A MEDEVAC FLIGHTS



Known/Suspected SWA Heroin Trafficking Routes

1. Overview of Trafficking Routes and Conversion Points. Narcotics intelligence focuses on Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and perhaps even Lebanon as the major locations for conversion of SWA opium into heroin. Recent reports indicate Italy and France may also be involved, to a lesser degree, in this conversion process. There is some limited evidence of small shipments of raw opium being sent directly to the United States for conversion, but any concerted effort in this area is unlikely. For the purposes of this macro-study, Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon should be considered as the starting points for SWA heroin as its movement may impact on the USAF transportation system. Secondary, important points where the USAF transportation system may be initially targeted for the movement of SWA heroin are Greece, Italy and West Germany (especially West Berlin). It is also possible that USAF associated personnel may conspire to move SWA heroin from any point in USAFE to CONUS or to any other place in the world serviced by the USAF transportation system.

In short, any USAF air or land routes over which aircraft, vehicles, people or cargo move throughout USAFE are vulnerable to being targeted for moving SWA heroin.

2. Geographical Areas of Greatest Concern vis-a-vis the USAF Transportation System. Three geographical areas should be considered especially vulnerable to an organized effort to misuse the USAF transportation system to move heroin on a continuing basis. These areas are Turkey, Italy and Germany.

a. Turkey. Certainly, USAF-associated personnel in Turkey or transiting Turkey on a regular basis, if they were able to establish a Turkish national contact with access to the proper connections, would be in an ideal position to become involved in smuggling heroin. This situation in USAFE under these conditions, would approximate the situation exploited by individuals found to be similarly engaged in smuggling heroin out of SEA several years ago.

b. Italy. Italy has an ancient history of involvement in international trade/smuggling routes. Recent intelligence indicates that Italy is continuing this history regarding SWA heroin. This country not only appears to be a major transiting country but also a possible conversion point for this heroin. Previous studies have shown that there is a significant drug problem among USAF members stationed in Italy. Aviano AB, a base quite close to Trieste, an established entry point for SWA heroin traveling overland through the Balkans on its way to Germany; had the highest E-1 - E-4 self-admitted drug abuse rate (39%) among USAF members at 13 sites surveyed in USAFE in July 1978. The Leonardo da Vinci di Fiumicino Airport in Rome and possibly the Linati or Malpensa Airports in Milan are also suspected of being significant entry ports. Furthermore,

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some of the large quantity shipments of SWA heroin recently seized by authorities in the United States are known to have originated at or passed through the airport in Rome.

c. Germany. Finally, since Germany continues to be the biggest market for SWA heroin in Europe, it should be possible for personnel stationed in or transiting Germany, who have direct access to the USAF transportation system, to obtain quantities of SWA heroin for smuggling on a continuing basis. West Berlin is most notable in this regard. Eastern Europe associated airlines traveling between Turkey and other SWA countries and East Berlin are known to be charging rates which are much cheaper than Western airlines flying from the same regions to West Berlin. This fact has resulted in these routes apparently being used by SWA heroin smugglers to move heroin into the lucrative West German market. Once in East Berlin and through incoming customs checks, non-East European citizens can cross into West Berlin unchallenged. This is because of a unique international situation which allows non-East European citizens free movement throughout all occupied zones of Berlin. Furthermore, Rhein-Main AB, which is the hub of the USAF air routes within USAFE, is on the outskirts of the city of Frankfurt, a city which has reportedly replaced Amsterdam as the heroin distribution center for Europe.

## Appendix C

Areas Most Susceptible to SWA Heroin Smuggling and a Capsulization of Known Smuggling Techniques

1. Concealment on USAF aircraft/vehicles: This can be one of the most efficient and safest means of smuggling small packages of contraband. Generally speaking, for small packages, there are innumerable hiding places on USAF aircraft where the contraband can be secreted with very little chance that it will ever be found. AFOSI investigative files indicate that many of the finds of drugs concealed on USAF aircraft are accidental finds of abandoned or forgotten drugs. As mentioned at the beginning of this study, the 63.9 grams of heroin found aboard a KC-135, a find which eventually led to the initiation of Operation Seven Bulldogs, had been secreted in a 20-man life raft. The life raft had been removed for routine, periodic inspection from the aircraft the day after it landed at Barksdale AFB. The life raft then sat in the Life Support Section for several more days before it was opened for inspection and the heroin discovered. Of note in this case was the fact that an AFOSI source had reported that this same aircraft would be arriving from U-Tapao AB with a shipment of heroin. A thorough search of the aircraft by AFOSI agents, assisted by maintenance personnel, failed to disclose any illegal drugs. Perhaps this search activity dissuaded the smuggler from attempting to retrieve the heroin.

Several other investigations were initiated as a result of similar, accidental finds. These, and other investigations, wherein drug smugglers, in their confessions, outlined their techniques, attest to the fact that drugs can be secreted almost anywhere on an aircraft. Basically, anyone having direct access to an aircraft can exploit the aircraft for smuggling activities.

Generally, four groups of individuals are most likely to hide drugs on aircraft: aircrew members, aircraft maintenance personnel, munition maintenance personnel and life support personnel. For aircrew members, the advantage in secreting the drugs on the aircraft, rather than on their person or in their baggage, is that if the drugs are found during an inspection or by accident it is very difficult, and often impossible, to trace the drugs to one individual. Crew member access to and familiarity with almost all areas of the aircraft offers them a wide variety of "safe" hiding places. Experience gained through watching aircraft inspections, to include inspections using drug detection dogs, assists them in determining which areas receive more thorough inspections than others.

Aircraft maintenance, munitions maintenance and life support personnel can normally be expected to hide drugs in areas with which they are most familiar and to which they have the greatest, unchallenged access. Individuals in these groups, who are part of a deployment team to a TDY location and who will be returning to their home base at relatively the same time as the tactical aircraft they are servicing, can hide drugs on these aircraft and retrieve them from the aircraft at their home base.

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On the other hand, smuggling by permanent party maintenance/life support personnel servicing transiting aircraft necessitates a conspiracy between these individuals and individuals assigned to bases where it is known the aircraft will port for some length of time, e.g., normally the home base of the aircraft. Knowing the schedules of MAC aircraft which fly established, continuing routes between various bases makes this procedure fairly easy and reliable. With such, aircraft concealments can be routinely scheduled and signalling devices can be used so that verbal communication between the conspirators can be kept to a minimum.

USAF land vehicles (e.g. trucks, automobiles, jeeps), because of their official nature and because, as in the case of aircraft, drugs found are difficult to trace to a specific individual, may also be targeted by smugglers to move SWA heroin over short distances. This would be especially true if the sources of the heroin or in-country market for the heroin were a remote USAF site.

2. Concealment on the person or in the personal baggage of travelers on USAF aircraft:

Courier smuggling has long been the favorite method of drug smuggling by organized criminal elements for high value drugs such as heroin and cocaine. A large portion of customs seizures of SWA heroin in the United States within the last nine months were seized from travelers on commercial aircraft. These individuals were apparently carrying heroin which they hoped to personally introduce into local drug markets/trafficking rings or they were acting as couriers for third parties. Presently, there is no information to indicate that organized criminal elements have targeted USAF personnel to move SWA heroin or that a group of USAF-associated personnel has involved themselves in an organized effort to smuggle heroin. Because of this, it is most likely heroin smuggling activities carried out by USAF travelers will be on a one time basis for personal use or in the hopes of selling it in an established market on the other end. A notable exception to this scenario would be aircrew members. As previously noted, aircrew members who fly established routes within USAFE and between USAFE and other areas of the world could establish ties to drug markets at their home base and TDY locations and repetitively move drugs between the two. Aircrew members involved in drug smuggling may decide to carry high value drug shipments, such as heroin, on their person or in their personal baggage rather than risk accidental discovery of their hiding place on the aircraft. This case may be especially true if the aircrew member's previous observations over the route he is flying lead him to believe that customs inspections of aircrew members will be lax.

Small packages of high value items such as heroin and cocaine can be concealed on or in a passenger's body without producing tell-tale bulges. A technique sometimes used to conceal drugs on one's person, and a technique which is potentially very dangerous, is to put the drug in a rubber ballon or condom and either swallow it or insert it in a body cavity. Those intimately familiar with customs inspections carried out

under the USAF and DoD Customs regulations (AFR 75-12 and DoD Regulation 5030.49R) know that smugglers don't necessarily have to go to this trouble. According to the Air Force Regulation: "Personnel inspections consist of a visual check of unusual bulges under clothing, opening of loose fitting outer clothing, emptying pockets, and so forth. Military narcotic detection dog teams will not be used to inspect passengers and crew members unless there is a specific reason to suspect the individuals. The decision to perform dog-check is made by the installation commander or by direction of the major command or the customs advisor."

Smuggling via personal baggage continues to be a favorite method used by civilian drug couriers who carry fairly large quantities. Drugs concealed in false bottom suitcases, false bottom aerosol cans, and in artifacts contained in suitcases are encountered regularly by custom inspectors at U.S. ports of entry. Although there are no recent such findings involving USAF personnel or personnel travelling via USAF aircraft who were using these techniques to smuggle heroin; in Feb 80, an AFOSI source reported an airman had smuggled 25 grams of hashish from Torrejon AB, Spain to Aviano AB, Italy secreted in a canteen which was part of his field gear. The airman told the source he had put the hashish in plastic zip-lock bags which he put in the canteen and then he filled the canteen with water. According to the airman, the canteen was checked by authorities at Aviano AB but the hashish was not found.

If required customs inspections are properly and conscientiously carried out, they provide a major deterrent to this type of smuggling activity. Casualness in performing these activities or knowledge that customs inspections are not being carried out as required along various air routes are quickly passed by word of mouth and offer attractive targets of opportunity for smugglers. A recent criminal intelligence report from AFOSI Detachment 6201, London, England focuses in on one such specific vulnerability. An AFOSI agent from this detachment traveling via a regularly scheduled C-141 out of Rhein-Main AB, Germany, overheard a MAC passenger specialist advise another passenger prior to boarding the aircraft at Cigli Airport, Turkey (an airport on the outskirts of Izmir) that the baggage inspection had been "greased." The agent noted then that the passengers' carry-on baggage was not checked by customs officials at any point in the trip from Cigli to Athens to Rhein-Main AB. Upon deplaning at Rhein-Main AB, the AFOSI agent overheard two passengers remark that if "they had known customs was so easy, they would have considered bringing some 'stuff' out."

3. Concealment in Household Goods Shipments and Cargo: Both household goods (HHG) shipments and cargo returning to the United States, by regulation, undergo detailed customs inspections. Still, customs reports, investigative files and criminal intelligence reports indicate that this method of smuggling persists. Drug smuggling via HHG shipments is most likely to involve drugs intended for personal use or for one-time sale in an illicit market. An organized effort by an established criminal element

could, however, target individuals to act as "couriers" using their HHG shipments. There is some evidence that this type of activity was used by military members smuggling heroin out of SEA in the late sixties and early seventies.

Generally, drugs smuggled through HHG shipments are secreted in furniture, stereo equipment, artifacts (statues, candles, etc.), shoes/boots and sometimes in the crating or packaging material itself. An interesting technique used by an airman was reported by Detachment 6202 in Sep 79. The airman admitted smuggling marijuana in stereo components in his HHG shipment. In order to prevent detection by drug detection dogs he placed the plastic bags in a silver foil bag, a bag intended for use in packaging aircraft parts for shipment. These were then heat sealed to keep the marijuana fresh and to prevent detection by drug detection dogs.

The large number of possible hiding places in HHG shipments for small, high-value packages such as heroin and the smugglers ability to sufficiently mask the odor of the heroin so that it will not be picked up by drug detection dogs make it almost impossible for dedicated Military Customs Inspectors (MCI) to thoroughly inspect every possible hiding place in every shipment. A coordinated effort between AFOSI and MCIs should, at least, help MCIs concentrate detailed inspections for such packages on "high risk" individuals as identified through AFOSI source information.

Cargo transported via USAF aircraft is handled by Aerial Port personnel. Although, as mentioned earlier, cargo destined from overseas areas to the CONUS must undergo custom inspections, Aerial Port personnel are in an excellent position to "beat" this inspection on a continuing basis. In the first place, these individuals can determine exactly how the customs inspections are being carried out. This gives them an insight into how to best secret the heroin so that there will be minimum risk of detection during inspection. Furthermore, since Aerial Port personnel are responsible for loading and unloading cargo from aircraft, they can slip a small package onto or slip it out of a pallet with little chance they will be detected.

In order to complete the smuggling connection, the Aerial Port individual inserting the drug package into the cargo pallet could recruit a counterpart at the delivery point. He in turn, could pick up the package before the pallet is broken down or, in cases where the drugs are secreted in legitimate cargo designated for legitimate units, the counterpart could retrieve the drug package from the legitimate crate prior to delivery of the crate to the appropriate unit. Here again, a simple system of signalling devices can be set up to insure that the receiving party knows which pallet is carrying the package and which package to retrieve. The use of such a system also keeps the need for direct communication between the two conspirators to a minimum. There are numerous other methods which can be used by such conspirators. For example, a package can be addressed to a non-existent unit on a large base. An individual, claiming to represent that unit and bearing seemingly legitimate paper work, could pick up the package shortly after the pallet was broken down. This method is a little more risky in that it adds an additional area which may raise suspicions.

4. Concealment in the Mail: Analysis of AFOSI investigative files and drug intelligence reports suggest that one of the most popular drug smuggling methods used by USAF-associated personnel is smuggling through the mail. Although, in rare cases, large quantities of drugs have been intercepted while in mail channels, the vast majority of such smuggling activity involves personal use quantities of drugs. Overseas (e.g. APO) mail carried by USAF aircraft and managed at overseas locations by USAF personnel can be targeted for smuggling activity. Any military or DoD member stationed overseas has direct access to this mail system. Furthermore, military members can unwittingly be used to introduce such contraband into US mail channels as a "favor to a friend." Smuggling even small quantities of SWA heroin can be very profitable business. This fact increases the potential for misuse of this system to smuggle SWA heroin.

Smuggling through the mail is probably the most popular form of drug smuggling for two reasons: the ease with which the activity can be carried out and the confidence smugglers have that use of this system provides some assurance they will not be caught. The first reason is very easy to understand. Any USAF member has direct access to the mail system and concealment techniques, although sometimes quite intricate, are relatively simple to carry out. The individual does not have to have access to an aircraft or cargo and decide how best to conceal the drugs on/in one of these areas. Nor does the individual have to risk concealment on his person or personal baggage and submit himself to the possible severe psychological stress of going through a customs inspection while in possession of the drugs.

The other reason, confidence in not being caught, derives from the individual's perception of legal restrictions concerning the interception of U.S. mail and from his ability to protect himself from being identified as the sender or recipient of the package. According to paragraph 6003c, DoD Regulation 5030.49R, first class mail may not be opened "by military customs or postal officials, regardless of the rationale" but must be forwarded to the appropriate U.S. Customs Service activity for examination. This restriction, while protecting one of our basic rights as U.S. citizens, helps give "barracks lawyers" the impression that smuggling through the mail is a relatively safe method of smuggling. Although regulations require that military postal clerks identify every mailer "by checking his official permanent identification card (DD Forms 2A, 2AF, 1173, etc.) against the return address entered on each parcel and those letters accepted by the clerks" (Paragraph 6003h, DOD Reg 5030.49R), AFOSI files indicate that occasionally USAF members have entered, into the system, mail which did not contain their correct identity. Because of its small quantity-high value nature, significant dollar amounts of heroin could be concealed in letter mail. The tremendous volume of letter mail handled by most APO locations greatly increases the intended smuggler's chances he will be able to use letter mail bearing fictitious return address information to smuggle heroin. If the smuggler is successful in his efforts to enter the letter or package into the mail system with incorrect return address information it may be virtually impossible to identify the sender even if the package/letter is legally intercepted and found to contain illicit drugs.

AFOSI drug intelligence reports also suggest that smugglers have developed methods of protecting the recipient of the letter/package. The methods range from very sophisticated techniques of signalling the recipient that the mail has been opened to the simple, yet apparently effective, technique of addressing the mail to a correct address but to a fictitious name.

A wide variety of concealment devices have been employed by smugglers using mail channels to help disguise the drugs if the package is opened for customs inspections. One of the more popular devices is a candle. A large candle can be hollowed out, filled with drugs and then resealed. The wax apparently prevents release of any detectible odor from the drug (even by drug detection dogs). This method has sometimes backfired on smugglers who were not careful during the packaging procedure and inadvertently transmitted minute quantities of the drug to the candle and package - just enough of the material to cause a dog to alert on the package. Other concealment devices encountered include books, artifacts and monkey-pod cake dishes. In the later case, the lacquer scent of the cake dish apparently prevented drug detection dogs from alerting on the package.

5. Conclusions: The areas discussed in the preceding paragraphs are not all inclusive in that, as was initially pointed out, smuggling techniques and concealment devices are limited only by the ingenuity and brashness of the smugglers. Still, the four areas discussed above represent the those most frequently targeted by drug smugglers according to information contained in AFOSI files. In this regard, they should be considered as offering the greatest, across-the-board vulnerability to the USAF transportation system. Once again, it must be emphasized that it would be impossible to drive these vulnerabilities out of existence through regulation alone. In fact, the current regulations, when properly followed, appear to offer a sufficient deterrent to smuggling through the USAF transportation system. It is up to USAF officials, at all levels, who have been assigned responsibilities under these regulations to insure they are being properly and thoroughly carried out. These officials should also identify and correct weaknesses within their local system. AFOSI should assist these officials, through AFOSI sources and collection activity, to identify specific weaknesses and should keep command officials apprised of the general drug availability in their local area and how that availability may influence smuggling activities.